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Abstract 
Analysing the roll call votes of the MPs of the Weimar republic we find that 1) party 
competition in the Weimar parliaments can be structured on two dimensions: a left-right 
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of the votes across the lifespan of the Republic 2) that the nearly all parties were 
troubled by intra-party divisions, though especially the national socialists and the 
communists became homogenous in the last years of the Republic.  
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Introduction 
The interest in the Weimar republic has been large by both scholars in economics (e.g. 
Myerson 2004; van Riel & Schram 1993), history (e.g. Jones 1972, 2009; Schönhoven 
2002) and political science (e.g. Berg-Schlosser 1995; Berman 1997; Lehmann 2009; 
Lieberman 1998; Loewenberg 1971). The studies have covered a wide range of topics 
from the elections, the political culture, and the rise of national socialism to the various 
reasons that lead to the demise of the republic. One part of the Weimar republic is 
however, less studied: the parliament of the Weimar republic – the Reichstag. 
Specifically, how the elected representatives voted and how the voting patterns can help 
identify shifts in policies and intra-party conflict. 
 In this paper we ask to how the party competition in the parliament was 
structured and how the main parties of the Weimar republic dealt with this, especially in 
terms of intra-party politics. In order to answer this question we analyze roll call votes 
cast during the Weimar parliaments by using ideal point estimation. From this analysis 
we are not only able to see where the parties were positioned in relation to one another, 
but also to address the various fluctuations among the parties, to analyze which 
dimensions were relevant for the party competition during the Weimar years and to 
discuss the dynamics of intra-party politics among the major parties of the era. 
 Our results show several interesting factors. First, two dimensions were in play 
in parliament. This is an ideological left-right dimension and, more importantly, a pro 
vs. anti-Weimar republic dimension. We argue that this second dimension was salient 
for too many parties for the republic to be viable in the long run. The fall of the republic 
was influenced by the anti-republican forces of both left and right, whereas the 
importance and influence of the pro-republican parties dropped markedly over the few 
years the republic existed. This is corroborated by Jones (1972) who argues that the 
bourgeois politics fragmented over the years of the Weimar Republic. Secondly, we find 
that this was not limited to the later years of the Republic, as argued by Loewenberg 
(1971), but can be found throughout the entire short lifetime of the Republic. Thirdly, 
we find that the two-dimensional solution was stable despite large variation in the 
content of votes, making the Weimar Republic different to other democracies collapsing 
at the same period. Finally, we argue that intra-party conflict was evident for many 
parties on both dimensions.  
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The Weimar republic and its parties 
From its creation the Weimar republic was haunted by a large degree of instability 
which in the end helped its demise. This instability was based on several factors. One of 
them being the fragmentation of the parliament in several smaller parties which comes 
natural from a proportional electoral system (Duverger 1954). However, this was not the 
only reason as a fragmented parliament was also found in other countries in the period 
between WW1 and WW2, for example the Netherlands (Berg-Schlosser 1995). What 
was even more important was the fact that the parties on the right, National 
Conservatives (DNVP) and National Socialists (NSDAP), and on the left, Independent 
Social Democrats (USPD) and Communists (KPD), belonged to the group of the largest 
parties between 1920 and 1932. These parties did not accept the 1919 constitution and 
wanted it replaced with a different system. The remaining parties – Social Democrats 
(SPD), the Catholic ‘Zentrum’ (Centre Party) and the left-liberal Democratic Party 
(DDP) – had been the guardians of the parliamentary democracy which was in place 
from 1919-1933.
1
 The vast differences was also seen by the fact the Republic had a vast 
number of changing governments during its brief existence. 
 External factors also had a great deal of influence on the instability. From the 
outset the Republic was dealt a poor hand, as the shifting coalitions had to deal with the 
problems stemming from the First World War and especially the peace negotiations 
(Kolb 2002:1-10; Schönhoven 2002). While the Social Democrats, the Centre Party and 
DDP all favored and supported the negotiated peace, they were faced with the task of 
implementing the dictates of the Allied victors. In the Versailles treaty Germany was 
not only asked to pay a substantial financial amount as penalty for the war, but also to 
reduce its military forces substantially and of course also deal with the loss of parts of 
what used to be German territory. Also the often occurring coup attempts by right wing 
forces as well as the inflation and the occupation of the Ruhr-area by French and 
Belgian troops had a destabilizing influence on the Weimar republic. 
  
The party system of the Weimar Republic 
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 Note that since 1930 the president of the Weimar Republic installed the government by ignoring the 
preferences of the parliamentary groups in the Reichstag.  
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In German society there are historically two distinct societal cleavages in play; one 
between the state and the Catholic Church and one between worker and capital (Lipset 
& Rokkan 1967). The former came to prominence in the cultural battle of the 1870es 
and 1880es in the early days of the German State, and it resulted in the formation of the 
Centre Party to represent the interests of Roman-Catholics in Germany. The latter was 
the conflict between employer and employee which saw especially the development of 
the Social Democratic party and later the Communist Party. A general overview of the 
major parties of the Weimar republic on that we restrict our analysis can be found in 
table 1.  
Following socio-historical approaches on the German society and the party 
system in the late 19
th
 and the early 20
th
 century, four to five social groups or so-called 
‘milieus’ can be identified that have a special relationship towards the major parties 
(Peukert 1987: 149-161; Lepsius 1993). These milieus and thus the parties belonging to 
them can be divided into two categories; the individually oriented milieu and the 
organizational milieu (Pyta 1997: 208-213). Inside the person-centered milieus, we can 
differentiate between a bourgeois-urban one and an agrarian-rural one. Two liberal 
parties represented the bourgeois-urban societal milieu. This is, first, the more right-
wing orientated German Peoples Party (DVP) and, secondly, the more left-wing 
Democratic Party (DDP), which renamed itself into German State Party in 1930 
(‘Deutsche Staatspartei’, DStP). Members of the DVP and DDP in particular were 
represented in almost every cabinet during the Weimar Republic. As the scores of the 
Rice index, which measures the cohesion within a parliamentary group and can range 
between zero (stand-off inside a group) and one (complete internal consensus; see Rice 
1925), shows, the scores of both liberal parties are by trend smaller compared to the 
other main parties represented in parliament. The latter is typical for liberal parties, 
which are often described as weakly organized (e.g., Katz & Mair 1995).
2
 The agrarian-
rural milieu was mostly represented by the national-conservative DNVP, which favored 
the reintroduction of the monarchy and an autocratic political system. The importance 
of the liberal parties dropped markedly during the Weimar years, in the first election in 
1919 they won 23 percent of the votes, but only 2 percent in the last election in March 
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 We refer to the data used in this article to calculate the cohesion of parliamentary parties in the Weimar 
Republic. The data is described in the subsequent sections of this paper in more detail. For a more in-
depth analysis of the cohesion of all party groups represented in the Reichstag see Markmann (1955).  
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1933 (Kolb 2002: 308-309). Also the DNVP had losses from around 20 percent in 1924 
to between 6 and 8 percent in the elections from 1930-1933. However, it should be 
noted that the DNVP made a substantial move in its policy during these years. Between 
1925 and 1928 the party moved from being one of the right-wing to a more widely 
accepted conservative party. Yet, in 1928 the move was reversed with the election of 
Alfred Hugenberg as party leader and cooperation with the NSDAP began, for instance 
in the referenda concerning the Young-agreement in 1929 and in general in opposition 
to the republic (Schulze 1998: 310-312; Kolb 2002: 122; Mergel 2005: 411-412).
3
 As 
the scores of the Rice index show, in the legislative period from 1928 until 1930 the 
cohesion among the DNVP MPs was quite low, which reflects conflicts inside this party 
during the second half of the 1920s. According to Longerich (1995: 189-190), there is 
evidence that at the end of the 19
th
 century a right-wing extremist, anti-Semitic and 
nationalist milieu arose. In accordance with the decline of the agrarian-rural milieu, the 
right-wing extremist and nationalist one formed the basis for the electoral success of the 
NSDAP, which is since 1928 one of the most strongly cohesive parties represented in 
the Reichstag.  
The socialist and the Catholic milieus are, by contrast, characterized by a strong 
organizational background. The infrastructure and network of Labor unions and of the 
Roman-Catholic church provided the foundation of the success of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Centre Party, respectively. One would therefore expect a high 
degree of internal cohesion, which, however, is the case for the parliamentary groups of 
Social Democrats and the Communists only. The SPD, however, split in 1917 into the 
Social Democrats and the Independent Social Democrats (USPD). The left-wing of the 
latter joined the newly founded KPD in 1920 and thus, also the left wing had its strong 
anti-republic party. The remaining part of the USPD returned mostly to the Social 
Democrats in 1923. Likewise to the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany since 
1949, the Catholic milieu had its special Bavarian party. In favor of the ‘Bavarian 
Peoples Party’ (BVP), the Centre Party did not run for elections in Bavaria. In contrast 
to the Centre Party, which participated in every coalition government in the era of the 
Weimar Republic from 1919 until 1932, the BVP was more skeptical towards the 
Weimar Republic and dissolved the common parliamentary club with the Centre Party 
                                                 
3
 The moderate wing, lead by the former party leader, Count Westarp, left the party to form the 
‘Conservative Peoples Party’ (KVP, see also Jones 2009). 
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already in 1920. In addition, during the 1925 presidential election the BVP did not 
support the Centre Party candidate Wilhelm Marx, but rather the candidate of the right 
wing and monarchist Paul von Hindenburg (Schönhoven 1972). 
 
--- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Analyzing the Dimensionality of Parliaments 
The question of the dimensionality of a political system is far from trivial. 
Unidimensionality is theorized to be stable and multidimensionality to be chaotic 
(McLean 2006: 153-154). Theoretically, it is possible that a large number of dimensions 
exist in any political space. Empirically, it is another story. The fact is that 
unidimensionality is dominant in most of the studies of comparative politics. The 
concept of left-right has dominated politics since before the French revolution and its 
importance has become even larger ever since the dominance of spatial analysis in 
comparative politics starting with Downs (1957). Nagel (2006) presents two theoretical 
considerations why unidimensionality is so predominant; it is either due to the fact that 
with the left-right we can explain a large part of the variation and hence, the need for 
more dimensions does not exist. Or it could be due to a normative wish of achieving 
majority rule, which unidimensionality helps as the median voter will be the Condorcet 
winner. Robertson (2006) follows some of the same argumentation and concludes that 
politics is unidimensional and that the only dimension may well be called left and right.  
The last decades have seen a dramatic increase in work determining the 
dimensionality of political space and estimating the positions of the political actors in 
such a space using some form of roll call votes as data. While these studies on the one 
hand show strong first dimensions there are empirical examples from around the world 
that legislatures can be multidimensional. It was the introduction of the NOMINATE 
approach (Poole & Rosenthal 1997) which was the influential factor in the vast quantity 
of studies of the roll call votes of the U.S. Congress. It was followed by works such as 
Voeten (2000) on the UN, Hix (2001) on the European Parliament, Schonhardt-Bailey 
(2003) on the UK House of Commons in the mid-19th century, and Morgenstern (2004) 
on Latin American democracies. Other methods have also appeared, for instance the 
Optimal Classification procedure (e.g. Rosenthal & Voeten 2004; Hansen 2008). In 
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recent years, however, studies by Rosenthal & Voeten (2004) on the French fourth 
republic, Schonhardt-Bailey (2003) on the House of Commons 1841-47, and Spirling & 
McLean (2006; 2007) on the modern House of Commons have used NOMINATE or 
Optimal Classification. Studies on the voting behavior of members of the European 
Parliament are also becoming increasingly common (e.g. Hix 2001; Hix, Noury & 
Roland 2006).  
Comparative research in the dimensionality of parliaments has shown that it is 
often a government-opposition dimension and not a left-right conflict which is the 
primary dimension (Hix & Noury 2008). This is due to the specific institutional features 
of parliamentary systems where it is the norm that the government controls the agenda 
and the opposition react to the proposal put forward by the government making it a 
question of whether you are with or against the government that the determines how you 
vote as an MP. The left-right dimension does however, come out as a second dimension 
in most of the studied parliaments (Hix & Noury 2008). Even in non-parliamentary 
system like the US two dimensions do occur, albeit infrequently. Poole & Rosenthal 
(1997) have shown that the US Congress is heavily dominated by one dimension; a 
liberal-conservative, though in some periods also a second dimension which can be 
labeled progressive-conservative, which from around 1945-1960 was a question of civil 
rights. For the European Parliament it has been shown that the primary dimension is 
left-right but a second dimension on EU-integration can also be found, which given the 
particularities of the European Parliament perhaps is not surprising (Hix 2002; Hix, 
Noury & Roland 2006). 
As the Weimar republic was a parliamentary system we would expect to find 
two dimensions; a government-opposition dimension as the first and a left-right 
dimension as the second. If this is the finding then the Weimar parliaments were 
"normal" parliaments compared to other across time. However, if this is not the case 
there is another expectation that we can have; due to the specific features of the parties 
competing during the Weimar years we know that two distinct groups exist; the pro-
republic parties and the anti-republic parties. Hence, in case a government-opposition 
dimension and a left-right can not be found we might expect that what occurs instead is 
a pro-/anti-republic dimension. 
 
7 
Operationalisation and data 
In the Weimar parliaments a roll call vote could be called following §105 of the 
Standing Order of the parliament when at least 50 attending members requested this 
(Markmann 1955: 22). Because the number of MPs increased from 459 in the first 
legislative period, which lasted from 1920-1924, up to 577 in 1930 and reached a 
number of 608 in July 1932, it should became easier for MPs to get the required support 
for calling a recorded vote: while in 1920 almost 11% of the Reichstag members had to 
ask for a roll-call vote, the share of required MPs decreased significantly over time. In 
addition, in only a few cases § 106 of the Standing Order of the Reichstag prohibited 
recorded votes. Roll call votes were not allowed in case of some procedural aspects like 
questions on the number of members of a committee or the length, agenda and 
postponement of a session. Thus, the Standing Order of the Reichstag provided rather 
small obstacles to stop requests for calling a recorded vote.
4
 The problem of selection 
bias in roll call voting as argued by Carrubba et al. (2006) and Hug (2009) is hence, a 
minor issue for the analysis of roll call votes in the Weimar Republic. The Rice index 
also suggests that while  
For the analysis we created a dataset of all roll call votes from 1920-1933 on the 
basis of the Reichstag protocols.
5
 However, due to the frequent elections in the Weimar 
years we can not include all parliaments in our analysis. For four elections the number 
of roll call votes cast before the next election is so small that it is not feasible to perform 
any form of analysis of these. An overview of which data has been included and which 
has been excluded can be found in table 2 below. 
 
--- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
For estimating the ideal points of the MPs we rely on the Bayesian item response theory 
model for ideal point estimation used by Clinton, Jackman and Rivers (2004). The 
model is estimated by using the PSCL routine for R authored by Jackman (2006). We 
do not estimate a pooled model but four separate models; one for each period. With the 
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 Likewise to other cases, there is no information on the number of all votes – recorded and non-recorded 
– in the Reichstag (see, e.g., Saalfeld 1995; Sieberer 2006). We are therefore not able to estimate the 
share of recorded votes on all votes conducted in the parliament of the Weimar Republic.  
5
 The protocols are electronically available from http://www.reichstagsprotokolle.de/rtbiiiauf.html. For 
replication purposes the dataset can be requested from the authors. 
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information presented in Table 2 combined with the often changing governments there 
is an overall problem for estimating the ideal points and hence determining the 
dimensionality. It would be preferable if the government composition was constant in 
the period for which the ideal points are estimated. However, this is not feasible as we 
will then end up with more periods with few votes, instead of as it now stands four 
periods were it is feasible to estimate the ideal points. We estimate the ideal points for 
the four periods separately, which in turn means that it is possible to determine and 
discuss the dimensionality of each period. Another reason for estimating the ideal points 
separately and not in a pooled version is the variation in the content of the votes. In 
Table 3 we present the content coded by five a priori selected categories. The most 
voluminous category in all four period is votes on economic issues. This is what would 
be expected for the Weimar Republic which was troubled by economic crisis for much 
of its lifetime. While the content share related to economic matters is stable there is 
much variation in the other four categories. Interior affairs accounts for over 40 per cent 
of the votes in the 1920-24 parliament, but only 15 per cent in the following one. 
Procedural issues and votes of confidence are barely 3 per cent of all votes in the first 
parliament we analyze, but nearly 20 per cent in the 1930-32 period.  
 
--- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The dimensionality and positions of the Weimar parliaments and MPs 
The question is whether the voting behavior fits best in one dimension or whether two 
dimensions are needed to produce the full picture. If we focus solely on one dimension, 
then the empirical analysis provides the ordering presented in Figure 1 below, where the 
unidimensional positions of the parties elected for the Weimar parliament from 1920-
1924 are shown.  
 
--- FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
In the left end of the dimension can the Social Democrats be found, and at the opposite 
end the German National Conservative Party (DNVP). However, there are several 
indications in this picture that one dimension might not be enough to explain voting 
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behavior in the Weimar parliament. First of all, the DNVP and – for most of the time – 
the SPD were in opposition in the period pictured above.
6
 This would mean that the 
dimension on which the parties are located is not a government-opposition dimension, 
but a left-right dimension.
7
 On the other hand, when we include the other parties in our 
perspective this is also not right. That the USPD and the KPD should be to the right of 
the Social Democrats and very close to the Catholic Centre Party as well as the two 
liberal parties DDP and DVP tells us that a second dimension is in all probability 
needed to achieve the full picture. 
 When the two dimensional model is taken into account we do correctly classify 
97 per cent of the votes cast, versus 89 per cent for the unidimensional model. In Figure 
2 we show the positions of the individual MPs for the 1920-24 parliamentary period. 
The horizontal axis resembles the unidimensional setup discussed above. The members 
from SPD, USPD and KPD are positioned to the left, whereas the Catholics, the 
Bavarian People's Party and the DDP are moderately placed around the center. The 
national liberal DVP is further to the right and near the DNVP. For the second 
dimension we should from cleavage theory expect that it is about pro- vs. anti-clerical 
forces. However, as the vertical axis has the Centre Party at one end followed by the 
two liberal parties and the Social Democrats as well as the somewhat anti-clerical 
position of the Catholic Bavarian People's Party the interpretation of this dimension can 
not be supported empirically. What does provide a possible explanation is the almost 
identical position on the second dimension by the Communists and the German 
Nationalists. This resembles what we term the pro-/anti-republic dimension. Both the 
Communists and the German Nationalists were at best lukewarm in their support of the 
Weimar republic. On the other side we find the DDP, SPD and a bit surprising the DVP 
as more positive towards the Republic. The USPD which in this period is at point of 
breaking up holds a less negative view of the Republic than the Communists. For the 
Centre Party and the two liberal parties the intra-party variation is much larger than for 
the other parties. The relationship between the Centre Party and its sister-party should 
also be noted as the BVP hold a more skeptical view to the Republic than the Centre 
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 The Social Democrats were a member of the coalition government of chancellor Wirth from October 
1921 until November 1922 as well as of the Stresemann cabinet, which lasted from August until 
November 1923.   
7
 Also for the other periods analysed in this paper does a true government-opposition dimension not occur 
in the unidimensional model. Neither does a true left-right dimension.  
10 
Party. From this it is not surprising that the BVP did not support the Centre Party 
candidate for President in 1925, but instead put their support behind an anti-republican 
candidate and clear supporter of a monarchical-authoritarian form of governance, Paul 
von Hindenburg (Schönhoven 1972). Lieberman (1998) argues that it is the parties 
which we find to be at the upper end on the vertical axis which during the Weimar 
Republic consistently advocated anti-system ideologies. Turning to the intra-party 
differences among the MPs we learn that most parties have outliers on both dimensions. 
However, the Centre Party is, while more coherent on the socio-economic dimension 
much less so when it comes to the pro/anti-republic dimension, though the members are 
still mostly supportive of the republic. On the other hand, the conservative DNVP 
experience most of the variation on the socio-economic dimension while they are more 
cohesive when it comes to having a skeptical view towards the republic.  
 
--- FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The existence of the second dimension of pro-/anti-republic sentiments can also be 
found in the parliamentary period of 1924-1928 (see figure 3). We correctly classify 98 
per cent of the votes cast in this period with two dimensions, and 91 per cent with one 
dimension, and find that the first, the horizontal dimension, is a left-right dimension. 
The Communists and Social Democrats can be found at the left with the Social 
Democrats much more moderate than the Communists. The members of the Centre 
Party, DDP and DVP have in comparison with the previous legislative period moved to 
the right of the centre and the German National Conservatives have moved towards the 
centre. This period was the first where the National Socialists gained representation in 
the Reichstag. They take a position on the left-right dimension left of the centre near the 
Social Democrats. The positions on the second dimension are different; here we find 
that the DNVP and the National Socialists have a strong anti-Weimar position. The 
members from DDP, SPD, the Centre Party, the BVP and DVP have a positive to 
neutral position towards the republic and thus the principles of parliamentary 
democracy. Somewhat surprising is the moderate position for the Communist party in 
this period on the dimension mentioned last. It would have been expected that this party 
would have had a position like the German National Conservatives and the National 
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Socialists. This period also has its share of outliers in relation to intra-party positions. 
The Centre Party has moved closer together on their position towards the republic than 
in the previous period. The interesting story here is found among the conservative 
DNVP where the main part of the party, among them also their leader Count Westarp, 
are close together, where as the later leader of the party, Alfred Hugenberg, is the most 
anti-republican of all MPs in the parliament 1924-28. 
 
--- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
Turning to the parliamentary period of 1928-1930 the two dimensions which together 
correctly classify 98 per cent of the votes, and 86 per cent for the unidimensional model, 
we still find the exact same dimensions as in the previous periods (see figure 4). The 
horizontal dimension is still the left-right dimension and the vertical dimension the pro-
/anti-republic dimension. The SPD and KPD are located at the left end of the horizontal 
dimension with the German Nationalist on the right end of the axis. Moderate positions 
are held by the Centre Party, DDP, DVP and the National Socialists. On the second 
dimension the anti-republic position are held by the Communists and the National 
Socialists, whereas the so-called ‘grand coalition’ between SPD, Centre Party, DVP, 
DDP and BVP, which was in office during this time period, has a clear positive view 
towards the republic.  
 
--- FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
From 1928-30 the Weimar republic was governed by coalition, which decisions had 
impact on the intra-party differences, notably among the Social Democrats, but to some 
extent also the conservatives. Among the latter party four distinct groupings can be 
found. One centered round Alfred Hugenberg, one around Count Westarp and two 
groupings differing not on socio-economic issues, but one being slightly less skeptical 
towards the republic than the other. It should be noted that it was in this period that 
Count Westarp lost the leadership of the party and was replaced by Alfred Hugenberg. 
Westarp withdrew from the DNVP and formed his own moderate “Conservative Peples 
Party”. The most fascinating result in this period is that while the Social Democrats are 
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very cohesive there are a handful of outliers. Usually, such outliers will be of little 
importance. However, four outliers in this period are very important. The four MPs not 
following the Social Democratic party discipline is the Chancellor Hermann Müller as 
well as three other Social Democratic ministers.
8
 This is surprising given the agreement 
between the Government and the coalition participants that in case of doubt ministers 
were allowed to vote against the government as happened in the case of the building of 
battleship for the German Navy. The estimated positions tell us another story. The four 
ministers in question are all placed closely to their government partners of the Centre 
Party and the DDP. When taking the standard errors into account, the ministers are 
significantly different in their positions than their party. This result makes us doubt that 
the Social Democratic ministers were under party discipline and that instead it was 
allowed for the ministers to differ from the official party line and that this opportunity 
was indeed used. 
 
 
--- FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE --- 
 
The positions of the legislative period from 1930 until summer 1932 are presented in 
Figure 5 above.
9
 Both the first dimension and the second dimension resemble those we 
have found in the other periods. The first dimension is left-right and the second 
dimension is the pro-/anti-republic. The two-dimensional model correctly classifies 99 
per cent of the votes in this period, 93 per cent is the percentage of votes correctly 
classified by the unidimensional model. Both the Social Democrats and the Communists 
are clearly to the left and both have virtually no outliers. On the other side of the axis 
the German Nationals hold a similar position. The few liberal MPs of the DVP and the 
renamed DDP also have coherent positions on both dimensions. On the second 
dimension it is again the Communists and the National Socialists who are against the 
republic. However, they are closely followed by the German Nationalists. The KVP is 
much more positive towards the Republic than the German Nationalists from which 
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 Carl Severing, Kurt Wissell and Rudolf Hilferding (see also Schröder 2001:6). The fourth Social 
Democratic minister, Robert Schmidt, is positioned within the other Social Democratic MPs. 
9
 Due to too few votes cast in the parliaments June 1932 – November 1932 and November 1932 – March 
1933 we have chosen to regard the period of 1930 – June 1932 as the last period for which it is possible to 
estimate positions. 
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they split, and follows the positions of the DVP and the renamed DDP. This informs us 
that the split which happened in the German Nationalists made it easier for the radical 
wing of the party to change to a much more skeptical position towards the Weimar 
republic than was the case before the split (Mergel 2003, 2005). In this period there are 
still outliers present, though to a lesser degree than previously. The Communists, Social 
Democrats and National Socialists are all very cohesive in their voting patterns. The 
conservative DNVP is also extremely cohesive, albeit more clearly on the pro-/anti-
republican dimension than on the socio-economic dimension. The Centre Party is now 
more stretched out on the socio-economic dimension than previously and somewhat 
more cohesive on the pro-/anti-republican dimension.  
 The overall patterns in the voting behavior that we have seen in the parliaments 
of the Weimar republic have two major implications. First of all, for nearly all parties at 
one point in time there are large discrepancies in how the MPs vote. This in turn mean 
that the voting patterns that we find can be used to interpret and understand the intra-
party politics of the parties of the Weimar republic in a quantitative fashion, something 
hitherto unknown. By presenting the voting patterns, the second part of the story is that 
we can understand the rise and importance of both right-wing and left-wing parties and 
the homogenous nature in which they voted at least in the later part of the Weimar 
republic. 
 
Discussion 
The results of the roll call vote analysis of MPs represented in the Weimar Reichstag 
have shown that in comparison to ‘modern’ parliamentary democracies the Reichstag of 
the Weimar republic was not structured by a government-opposition divide, but rather 
by two conflicts: while the first one reflected ideology and thus the left-right ordering of 
the parties, the second dimension shows the preferences of MPs with regard to the order 
of the political system. This is despite the (often used) possibility to vote the Chancellor 
or any minister out of office without offering a successor on the basis of a vote of 
confidence, which was provided by § 54 of the constitution of the Weimar Republic. In 
particular Communists and National Socialists made successfully use of this 
opportunity provided by the constitution to destabilize the political system even more. 
Whereas the (economically determined) left-right conflict is observable at least as the 
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second dimension in a number of parliaments according to Hix and Noury (2008), the 
conspicuous absence of the government-opposition dimension from the two-
dimensional model can be seen as a sign that the parliaments of the Weimar Republic 
was anything but a normal parliament, especially when we compare with other 
parliaments of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 century. What is further interesting is the stability of the 
dimensions. From the outset a left-right dimension can be observed as the first 
dimension and the pro-/anti-Republic dimension as a second. This is a remarkable 
finding when taking the distribution of the content of the votes into account (see table 
3). The variation in the policy areas the votes belong to could lead to vast differences in 
the estimated positions, which is far from being the case. The two-dimensional models 
explain at it least successful instance 97 per cent which informs us that the addition of a 
third dimension will provide relatively little information. The gain in information comes 
from moving from a unidimensional model to a two-dimensional model, where the 
increase in the percentage of correctly classified votes is higher than for instance for the 
U.S. Congress (see Poole & Rosenthal 1997:28). 
The extraction of a dimension that deals with the support and rejection of the 
current political system shows how disputed and polarized the political order as a whole 
in Germany was during the 1920s and early 1930s. Not only the representatives’ 
thinking of a divide between government and parliament, which had its roots in the 
Wilhelminan Empire, prevailed during the Weimar republic, so that parliamentary party 
groups that belonged to the ruling coalition did not support the government without 
major reservations, but moreover the voting behavior of MPs was structured by their 
attitude towards the new parliamentary democracy. Because this characteristic was 
observable not only in the parliaments elected during times of crisis, that is in 1920, 
1930 and 1932, but also the legislative periods from 1924 until 1928 and from 1928 
until 1930, in which the economic situation was mostly stable, show the robustness and 
‘institutionalization’ of the skepticism and – partly – the rejection of the republican-
parliamentary system regardless of economic constraints and foreign policy conflicts. 
Further, if the cleavage theory by Lipset & Rokkan (1967) is to be believed the relevant 
dimensions in the Weimar republic should be workers versus capital as one and state 
versus church as the other. The analyses presented have shown that these cleavages can 
not be found in the parliaments of the Weimar Republic. 
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Thus, there was only a small chance from the very beginning that the Weimar 
Republic could become a stable political system. If one of the major conflict lines in a 
parliament represents questions on the order of the political system and strong parties 
from different party families like the National Conservatives and the Communists rather 
than smaller, unimportant parties stood against the political system, then forming and 
maintaining a stable majority between parties that support the basic principles of 
parliamentary democracies becomes generally problematic. The latter is not only the 
case because the number of potential coalition parties that together capture a majority of 
seats in the parliament decreases, but also for the reason that other, ideologically 
determined conflict lines exist like the economic left-right dimension where the 
supportive parties of the Weimar Republic – Social Democrats, Catholics and the two 
liberal parties – clearly adopted different policy positions. When applying common 
theories of government formation that take office and policy constraints into account 
(for an overview see Laver and Schofield 1998; Müller 2009), the problems of forming 
a stable and long-lasting coalition government in the Weimar Republic between SPD, 
Catholics, left- and right-wing liberals and smaller regional parties becomes obvious 
because of their very different positions on the economic left-right dimension.   
One missed chance that possibly would have stabilized the political system was 
the partly change of the DNVP towards a modern conservative, ‘Tory’-like party in the 
mid 1920s (see Mergel 2003). As we saw in figures 3 and 4, there was a large degree of 
internal heterogeneity between the members of the parliamentary party group of the 
National Conservatives in particular on the ‘pro vs. contra Weimar Republic’ 
dimension. If the moderate wing of the party would have been able to enforce its 
positions against the radical, anti-system wing of the DNVP, stable majority coalitions 
between the centre and centre-right parties would have been a long-term alternative to 
an ideological heterogeneous ‘grand coalition’. With respect to the DNVP a question 
which naturally springs to mind when discussing the impact of intra-party politics on 
the behavior of MPs in this respect is how feasible it would be for MPs to form new 
parties, or join other parties, and still be re-elected. In the case of the Weimar republic 
the proportional element in the electoral system made it very easy for new parties to 
gain representation as the threshold for representation was set very low. However, it 
was less the case that MPs joined other parties rather than formed their own. The most 
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notable example would be that of Count Westarp, although his new party only gained a 
few seats in the last period under study here.  
A sustainable democracy requires compromise when there is no majority party. 
If compromise is absent breakdown threatens. This is what happened in the case of the 
Weimar Republic where the presence of the second dimension of pro-/anti-republic 
sentiment made compromise impossible. However, the Weimar Republic was not 
unique is this instance. Recently Aleman & Saiegh (2010) have presented an analysis of 
the rise and fall of democracy in Argentina 1916-1930. They conclude that for the first 
part of period the legislatures was two-dimensional with a government-opposition 
dimension as the first dimension and a policy dimension, of varying content, as the 
second dimension. However, in the second part of the period they analyze, Argentinean 
politics could be reduced to a pro-/anti-system dimension.
10
 Contrasting this to the case 
of the Weimar Republic the interesting part is that the re-alignment, which took place in 
the Argentinean case, did not happen in Weimar Germany. While democracy seems to 
been accepted in Argentina as shown by Aleman & Saiegh (2010), this was not the case 
for the Weimar Republic. The second dimension was thus present at the birth of the 
Republic and was alive and strong also at the end of the Republic. Despite the fact that 
the period of the Weimar Republic lies more than 80 years back there are still lessons to 
be learned for newly established democracies. If actors are repeatedly present which do 
not accept democracy and who are unwilling to compromise, then democracy will not 
be sustainable. 
 
                                                 
10
 Aleman & Saiegh (2010) conclude that it was primarily the distribution of power which leads to the 
breakdown of Argentinean democracy in 1930 and not the dimension per se.  
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Table 1: Major parties represented in parliament and government during the Weimar republic 
Party Parliamentary 
representation 
Government 
participation 
Milieu Basic ideological 
direction 
Mean cohesion score (Rice 
index)
 
1920-
1924 
Dec 
1924-
1928 
1928-
1930 
1930-
1932 
KPD 1920-1933 never Socialist communist 1 0.985 0.981 0.98 
USPD 1919-1924 Nov 1918-Feb 1919 socialist 0.805    
SPD 1919-1933 Nov 1918-Jun 1920;  
Oct 1921-Nov 1922; 
Aug 1923-Nov 1923; 
Jun 1928-Mar 1930 
social democratic 
0.997 0.999 0.998 0.995 
DDP (since 1930: 
DStP) 
1919-1933 Feb 1919-Jun 1919; 
Oct 1919-Jan 1927; 
Jun 1928-May 1932
1
 
bourgeois-
urban 
social liberal / left-
liberal 0.882 0.921 0.98 0.982 
Centre Party 1919-1933 Feb 1919-May 1932
1
 Catholic Catholic-
conservative 
0.944 0.955 0.95 0.97 
BVP 1920-1933 Nov 1923-Jun 1924 
Jan 1927-May 1932
1
 
Catholic-
conservative, 
regionalist 
0.914 0.954 0.972 0.985 
DVP 1919-1933 Jun 1920-Oct 1921; 
Nov 1922-Oct 1931
1
 
bourgeois-
urban 
national-liberal 
0.959 0.957 0.953 0.986 
DNVP 1919-1933 Jan 1925-Jan 1926; 
Jan 1927-Jun 1928; 
Jun 1932-Jun 1933
1
 
Agrarian-rural national-
conservative 0.94 0.978 0.917 0.952 
NSDAP 1924 (May)-
1933 
Jan 1933-May 1945
2
 Nationalistic, 
anti-Semitic 
Right-wing 
extremist, 
nationalistic 
 0.95 1 0.998 
1 
Including cabinets that were appointed by President von Hindenburg and not elected by the Reichstag. 
2
 Time period exceeds the period of the Weimar Republic. 
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Table 2: Data overview 
INCLUDED EXCLUDED 
Election Votes Election Votes 
June 1920 70 May 1924 16 
December 1924 200 July 1932 1 
May 1928 152 November 1932 6 
September 1930 104 March 1933 8 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Content of Roll Call Votes in Percentage 
 
Year/Dimension Economy Interior 
Affairs 
Foreign 
Affairs 
Agriculture 
and Trade 
Confidence 
votes and 
procedural 
votes 
1920-1924 43.7 42.3 5.6 5.6 2.8 
1924-1928 57.6 14.8 7.6 6.2 13.8 
1928-1930 46.7 20.4 10.5 14.5 7.9 
1930-1932 45.2 26.0 5.8 3.8 19.2 
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Figure 1: Positions of Parliamentary Parties in the first Weimar Reichstag (1920-1924) 
on one dimension 
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Figure 2: Positions of MPs in the Weimar Reichstag, 1920-1924 
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Figure 3: Positions of MPs in the Weimar Reichstag, 1924-1928 
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Figure 4: Positions of MPs in the Weimar Reichstag, 1928-1930 
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Figure 5: Positions of MPs in the Weimar Reichstag, 1930-1932 
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